I think so, is it like Jeux sans frontières with Stuart Hall & Eddie Waring only they get french doctors to dress up in giant garlic clove costumes?
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Brexit, for once some facts.
- Thread starter flecc
- Start date
Are you still in France you poor man? You must have been there for over a week! How are you getting along? Do you want me to send someone to get you out?
Better than $hitting in a burger box.
Sunbathers flee seafront as 'person cooking in beach hut' sparks fire
https://mol.im/a/8541533
Sunbathers flee seafront as 'person cooking in beach hut' sparks fire
https://mol.im/a/8541533
poor is right.. and I will have to endure the baguettes, the lucious tomatoes , and the weeds in the garden for a few more weeks ...
dead Cat of the Day goes to this
In the Telegraph
Russia interfered in Scottish independence Vote
"
Russia report: Kremlin 'tried to meddle in Scottish independence vote' - but did not target Brexit
Someone will be pleased that a Diamond Mine or was it Gold? seems to have gone missing.....
Which could prove to be the Biggest mistake Cummings has made yet, what if my countrymen demand a re-run?
Failte gu Alba
(sorry about the "a"
Report is due out at 10:30, this appeared before I read it at 6:45
How did this happen?
In the Telegraph
Russia interfered in Scottish independence Vote
"
Russia report: Kremlin 'tried to meddle in Scottish independence vote' - but did not target Brexit
Someone will be pleased that a Diamond Mine or was it Gold? seems to have gone missing.....
Which could prove to be the Biggest mistake Cummings has made yet, what if my countrymen demand a re-run?
Failte gu Alba
(sorry about the "a"
Report is due out at 10:30, this appeared before I read it at 6:45
How did this happen?
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This is a good article about herd immunity from the BBC.
Coronavirus: Did 'herd immunity' change the course of the outbreak?
What drove the government's thinking in the crucial stages of the coronavirus outbreak?
www.bbc.co.uk
Perhaps this is the reason for the dead cat?
Cat Hobbs@CatHobbs
· 9h
263 MPs voted in favour of parliamentary scrutiny of trade deals, 326 against Not only did MPs fail to protect our NHS, they didn't even vote to give *themselves* the powers to 'take back control' An absolute disgrace
The Conservative party is utterly lost to voters of this country
Cat Hobbs@CatHobbs
· 9h
263 MPs voted in favour of parliamentary scrutiny of trade deals, 326 against Not only did MPs fail to protect our NHS, they didn't even vote to give *themselves* the powers to 'take back control' An absolute disgrace
The Conservative party is utterly lost to voters of this country
Whoever it was Cummings is having them traced to offer them a Government post , as talent like that deserves reward
Enjoy yourself and I hope you are having a great & happy time.
Interesting two concurrent stories ...
Washed up Tory Liam Fox infamous in the 2009 expenses scandal, he was the Shadow Cabinet minister found to have the largest over-claim on expenses, decides to palm himself on the WTO as a reward.
Hopefully they simply bin his application.
New penalties proposed for rule-breaking MPs
The Commons standards committee says a wider range of penalties is required to effectively punish MPs.
www.bbc.co.uk
Washed up Tory Liam Fox infamous in the 2009 expenses scandal, he was the Shadow Cabinet minister found to have the largest over-claim on expenses, decides to palm himself on the WTO as a reward.
Brexit campaigner wants top job at the WTO
Liam Fox says not every country "sees every issue through the Brexit prism".
www.bbc.co.uk
Hopefully they simply bin his application.
They might well need a wider range of penalties, but they need to improve the process considerably.Interesting two concurrent stories ...
New penalties proposed for rule-breaking MPs
The Commons standards committee says a wider range of penalties is required to effectively punish MPs.www.bbc.co.uk
Washed up Tory Liam Fox infamous in the 2009 expenses scandal, he was the Shadow Cabinet minister found to have the largest over-claim on expenses, decides to palm himself on the WTO as a reward.
Brexit campaigner wants top job at the WTO
Liam Fox says not every country "sees every issue through the Brexit prism".www.bbc.co.uk
Hopefully they simply bin his application.
It should be fast, to some extent it should be automatic, and it should be straightforward for the electorate to identify and raise issues and offer evidence.
For example, a failure to make a financial interests declaration should by default disqualify the offender for a period of time. As soon as it has been identified. If I know an MP was given a freebie of some sort, I should be able to tell the registrar.
Of course, this could open floodgates to malicious complaints but it would also help to ensure that valid issues can and do get raised.
They need to tread very carefully with this. If they introduce a system which holds MPs to standards similar to those expected from the wider public, there may not be anyone left in the HoC. Most MPs would not be able to attain “general public” levels of integrity. They should be looking at introducing a lower standard for MPs with a bespoke developmental plan to enable them to work towards achieving the integrity possessed by the average Joe.Interesting two concurrent stories ...
New penalties proposed for rule-breaking MPs
The Commons standards committee says a wider range of penalties is required to effectively punish MPs.www.bbc.co.uk
I see the Russia report is now out:
Russia report reveals UK government failed to investigate Kremlin interference
Intelligence and security committee publishes long-delayed findings on Russia’s influence over UK politics
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/21/russia-report-reveals-uk-government-failed-to-address-kremlin-interference-scottish-referendum-brexit
Russia report reveals UK government failed to investigate Kremlin interference
Intelligence and security committee publishes long-delayed findings on Russia’s influence over UK politics
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/21/russia-report-reveals-uk-government-failed-to-address-kremlin-interference-scottish-referendum-brexit
My Tweet
oldgroaner@oldgroaner
·
54s
Replying to @TheNewEuropean
Cover your arses, eh? but it won't work, you stand condemned by the comments in The Three wise Monkeys Russian Interference Report
Where The Referendum is concerned
Hear no evil
See no Evil
Speak no Evil
Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab tweeted: "We've been clear that Russia must desist from its attacks on the UK and our allies.
"We will be resolute in defending our country, our democracy and our values from such Hostile State."
Though Tory party will keep accepting 'donations'....
"We will be resolute in defending our country, our democracy and our values from such Hostile State."
Though Tory party will keep accepting 'donations'....
I suggest the wise philosophical thoughts of Attilla the Hun might be a good starting point for setting Parliamentary Ethical standards
The report says that neither Boris Johnson nor Theresa May looked for evidence of Russian inference in the 2016 EU referendum
From the Report
Case study: the E U referendum
39. There have been widespread public allegations that Russia sought to influence the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. The impact of any such attempts would be difficult – if not impossible – to assess, and we have not sought to do so. However, it is important to establish whether a hostile state took deliberate action with the aim of influencing a UK democratic process, irrespective of whether it was successful or not.
40. Open source studies have pointed to the preponderance of pro-Brexit or anti-EU stories on
RT and Sputnik, and the use of ‘bots’ and ‘trolls’, as evidence of Russian attempts to influence the process.42 We have sought to establish whether there is secret intelligence which supported or built on these studies. In response to our request for written evidence at the outset of the Inquiry, MI5 initially provided just six lines of text. It stated that ***, before referring to academic studies.43 This was noteworthy in terms of the way it was couched (***) and the reference to open source studies ***. The brevity was also, to us, again,
40 The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster delegates to the Minister for the Constitution as appropriate. 41 DCMS Select Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’, HC 1791, 18 February 2019. 42 The DCMS Select Committee’s report Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ (HC 1791, 18 February 2019) surveys and comments on some of these studies. 43 Written evidence – HMG, 3 April 2018.
12
indicative of the extreme caution amongst the intelligence and security Agencies at the thought that they might have any role in relation to the UK’s democratic processes, and particularly one as contentious as the EU referendum. We repeat that this attitude is illogical; this is about the protection of the process and mechanism from hostile state interference, which should fall to our intelligence and security Agencies.
41. There has been credible open source commentary suggesting that Russia undertook influence campaigns in relation to the Scottish independence referendum in 2014.44 However, at the time ***. It appears that *** what some commentators have described as potentially the first post-Soviet Russian interference in a Western democratic process. We note that – almost five years on – ***.45
42. It was only when Russia completed a ‘hack and leak’ operation against the Democratic National Committee in the US – with the stolen emails being made public a month after the EU referendum – that it appears that the Government belatedly realised the level of threat which Russia could pose in this area, given that the risk thresholds in the Kremlin had clearly shifted, describing the US ‘hack and leak’ as a “game changer”,46 and admitting that “prior to what we saw in the States, [Russian interference] wasn’t generally understood as a big threat to [electoral] processes”.47
43. It appears that the Intelligence Community did learn lessons from the US experience, and HMG recognised the Russian threat to the UK’s democratic processes and political discourse. In May 2017, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) concluded that “***” and that “***”.48 Had the relevant parts of the Intelligence Community conducted a similar threat assessment prior to the referendum, it is inconceivable that they would not have reached the same conclusion as to Russian intent, which might then have led them to take action to protect the process.
(ii) Narrow coverage
44. The written evidence provided to us appeared to suggest that HMG had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes or any activity that has had a material impact on an election, for example influencing results.49,50 ***. ***.51
44 For example, it was widely reported shortly after the referendum that Russian election observers had suggested that there were irregularities in the conduct of the vote, and this position was widely pushed by Russian state media. We understand that HMG viewed this as being primarily aimed at discrediting the UK in the eyes of a domestic Russian audience. More recently, we note the study by Ben Nimmo – #ElectionWatch: Scottish Vote, Pro-Kremlin Trolls, 12 December 2017. 45 Oral evidence – GCHQ, *** December 2018 ***. 46 *** 47 *** 48 JIC Key Judgement, ***, 26 May 2017. 49 *** (written evidence – HMG, 29 June 2018). 50 We note that Arron Banks became the biggest donor in British political history when he gave £8m to the Leave.EU campaign. In October 2018, the Electoral Commission – which had been investigating the source of this donation – referred the case to the National Crime Agency, which investigated it ***. In September 2019, the National Crime Agency announced that it had concluded the investigation, having found no evidence that any criminal offences had been committed under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 or company law by any of the individuals or organisations referred to it by the Electoral Commission. 51 ***
13
45. This focus on *** indicates that open source material (for example, the studies of attempts to influence the referendum using RT and Sputnik, or social media campaigns referred to earlier) was not fully taken into account. Given that the Committee has previously been informed that open source material is now fully represented in the Government’s understanding of the threat picture, it was surprising to us that in this instance it was not.
46. Whilst it may be true that some issues highlighted in open source did not require the secret investigative capabilities of the intelligence and security Agencies o r were at the periphery of their remits, the Agencies nonetheless have capabilities which allow them to ‘stand on the shoulders’ of open source coverage: for example, GCHQ might attempt to look behind the suspicious social media accounts which open source analysis has identified to uncover their true operators (and even disrupt their use), or SIS might specifically task an agent to provide information on the extent and nature of any Russian influence campaigns.52 However, we have found *** which suggests that ***. ***.
...............................................................
Found no evidence?
Was any sought?
...............................................................
47. We have not been provided with any post-referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference, ***.53 This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, where an intelligence community assessment54 was produced within two months of the vote, with an unclassified summary being made public. Whilst the issues at stake in the EU referendum campaign are less clear-cut, it is nonetheless the Committee’s view that the UK Intelligence Community should produce an analogous assessment of potential Russian interference in the EU referendum and that an unclassified summary of it be published.55
48. ***. Even if the conclusion of any such assessment were that there was minimal interference, this would nonetheless represent a helpful reassurance to the public that the UK’s democratic processes had remained relatively safe.
Safe as one of Leaves promises before the referendum....
Case study: the E U referendum
39. There have been widespread public allegations that Russia sought to influence the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. The impact of any such attempts would be difficult – if not impossible – to assess, and we have not sought to do so. However, it is important to establish whether a hostile state took deliberate action with the aim of influencing a UK democratic process, irrespective of whether it was successful or not.
40. Open source studies have pointed to the preponderance of pro-Brexit or anti-EU stories on
RT and Sputnik, and the use of ‘bots’ and ‘trolls’, as evidence of Russian attempts to influence the process.42 We have sought to establish whether there is secret intelligence which supported or built on these studies. In response to our request for written evidence at the outset of the Inquiry, MI5 initially provided just six lines of text. It stated that ***, before referring to academic studies.43 This was noteworthy in terms of the way it was couched (***) and the reference to open source studies ***. The brevity was also, to us, again,
40 The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster delegates to the Minister for the Constitution as appropriate. 41 DCMS Select Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’, HC 1791, 18 February 2019. 42 The DCMS Select Committee’s report Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ (HC 1791, 18 February 2019) surveys and comments on some of these studies. 43 Written evidence – HMG, 3 April 2018.
12
indicative of the extreme caution amongst the intelligence and security Agencies at the thought that they might have any role in relation to the UK’s democratic processes, and particularly one as contentious as the EU referendum. We repeat that this attitude is illogical; this is about the protection of the process and mechanism from hostile state interference, which should fall to our intelligence and security Agencies.
41. There has been credible open source commentary suggesting that Russia undertook influence campaigns in relation to the Scottish independence referendum in 2014.44 However, at the time ***. It appears that *** what some commentators have described as potentially the first post-Soviet Russian interference in a Western democratic process. We note that – almost five years on – ***.45
42. It was only when Russia completed a ‘hack and leak’ operation against the Democratic National Committee in the US – with the stolen emails being made public a month after the EU referendum – that it appears that the Government belatedly realised the level of threat which Russia could pose in this area, given that the risk thresholds in the Kremlin had clearly shifted, describing the US ‘hack and leak’ as a “game changer”,46 and admitting that “prior to what we saw in the States, [Russian interference] wasn’t generally understood as a big threat to [electoral] processes”.47
43. It appears that the Intelligence Community did learn lessons from the US experience, and HMG recognised the Russian threat to the UK’s democratic processes and political discourse. In May 2017, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) concluded that “***” and that “***”.48 Had the relevant parts of the Intelligence Community conducted a similar threat assessment prior to the referendum, it is inconceivable that they would not have reached the same conclusion as to Russian intent, which might then have led them to take action to protect the process.
(ii) Narrow coverage
44. The written evidence provided to us appeared to suggest that HMG had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes or any activity that has had a material impact on an election, for example influencing results.49,50 ***. ***.51
44 For example, it was widely reported shortly after the referendum that Russian election observers had suggested that there were irregularities in the conduct of the vote, and this position was widely pushed by Russian state media. We understand that HMG viewed this as being primarily aimed at discrediting the UK in the eyes of a domestic Russian audience. More recently, we note the study by Ben Nimmo – #ElectionWatch: Scottish Vote, Pro-Kremlin Trolls, 12 December 2017. 45 Oral evidence – GCHQ, *** December 2018 ***. 46 *** 47 *** 48 JIC Key Judgement, ***, 26 May 2017. 49 *** (written evidence – HMG, 29 June 2018). 50 We note that Arron Banks became the biggest donor in British political history when he gave £8m to the Leave.EU campaign. In October 2018, the Electoral Commission – which had been investigating the source of this donation – referred the case to the National Crime Agency, which investigated it ***. In September 2019, the National Crime Agency announced that it had concluded the investigation, having found no evidence that any criminal offences had been committed under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 or company law by any of the individuals or organisations referred to it by the Electoral Commission. 51 ***
13
45. This focus on *** indicates that open source material (for example, the studies of attempts to influence the referendum using RT and Sputnik, or social media campaigns referred to earlier) was not fully taken into account. Given that the Committee has previously been informed that open source material is now fully represented in the Government’s understanding of the threat picture, it was surprising to us that in this instance it was not.
46. Whilst it may be true that some issues highlighted in open source did not require the secret investigative capabilities of the intelligence and security Agencies o r were at the periphery of their remits, the Agencies nonetheless have capabilities which allow them to ‘stand on the shoulders’ of open source coverage: for example, GCHQ might attempt to look behind the suspicious social media accounts which open source analysis has identified to uncover their true operators (and even disrupt their use), or SIS might specifically task an agent to provide information on the extent and nature of any Russian influence campaigns.52 However, we have found *** which suggests that ***. ***.
...............................................................
Found no evidence?
Was any sought?
...............................................................
47. We have not been provided with any post-referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference, ***.53 This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, where an intelligence community assessment54 was produced within two months of the vote, with an unclassified summary being made public. Whilst the issues at stake in the EU referendum campaign are less clear-cut, it is nonetheless the Committee’s view that the UK Intelligence Community should produce an analogous assessment of potential Russian interference in the EU referendum and that an unclassified summary of it be published.55
48. ***. Even if the conclusion of any such assessment were that there was minimal interference, this would nonetheless represent a helpful reassurance to the public that the UK’s democratic processes had remained relatively safe.
Safe as one of Leaves promises before the referendum....
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This isn't playing well for Cummings little Empire