Well, we were warned so no problem with me, after all there was nothing i hadn`t heard on TV or films of late (or the youngsters hanging around the chip shops)
Very funny I thought. Who will I vote for? who cares, they are all tarred with the same self interested brush when they get in power. Pin in map for me
When we get the votes counted over the whole country to elect a party I`ll get interested again.(proportional representation I believe?)
Dave
well to help proportion blame for our economic predicament and why I will continue to vote labour and ignore the bullshit and spin... I have copied this from a motorhome forum I use..it was posted by a good friend Brian Kirby
2010-05-01 10:38 AM .........What strike me about the coverage of this election is the way the press has failed to dwell on the real culprits of the current financial crisis, it was not caused by British people or Gordon Brown reneging on their mortgage, it was not caused by the bloke next door borrowing the money to buy his 42 inch plasma TV, The real villains are the parasites who played Monopoly with the savings of ordinary careful men and women............ Regards, PKC.
"While I enjoyed much of this analysis, and am instinctively drawn by much of it, I think the above is something of an oversimplification. My understanding is that while it contains much truth, it misses much of the complexity, and so hits the wrong (though not undeserving) target.
Many companies moved their production facilities to China and India, because these countries were cheap places to manufacture. Consequently, both India and China began making vast sums of money: far more than their economies could safely absorb, without risking the acute inflation that would kill their golden geese. So, both began investing in the West, from whence their new-found wealth came. These investments greatly increased the amount of money circulating in Western systems, such that the Western economies had insufficient investment opportunities to absorb it.
Meanwhile, somewhere in the American mid-West, some well meaning people hit on the idea of enabling poor people to get mortgages to buy houses by selling low cost, low start, mortgages, where the repayments ramp up year on year over five or so years. Initially this worked well, because the mortgages were responsibly sold, and the availability of funds was limited, so no-one could extend the facility indefinitely.
Wishing to make more funds available for this laudable enterprise, some bright sparks hit upon the idea of factoring these loans to sophisticated clients, such as pension funds, so that most of the money could be released back to the "savings and loans" institutions that had lent the mortgages. There was a risk appraisal of the mix of low cost mortgages to "normal" mortgages, to take account of the likely default rate of the overall package of loans, and the “collateralised debt obligation” (CDO), and its brethren, were born. The only problem with this arrangement initially, is that, as we now know, but did not then, it began releasing money back to the savings and loans, to be lent again, at around the time the big money from India and China began flooding Wall Street.
So, now we have a way to lend to the poor, offering a way to get the money back to lend again, plus lots of people with lots of money looking for places to invest it. Inevitably, the two got together, and the trouble started. The unscrupulous, and the merely pressurised, began lending, willy-nilly, to anyone with no money who wanted a house, knowing they could get most of the loan back via CDOs, and repeat the exercise almost indefinitely. They had invented the “money tree”, and discovered perpetual motion, in one hit!
The inevitable effect of this was to skew the risk profile of the CDOs, because the new loans were not responsibly sold and were far more likely to fail than had originally been contemplated. For some, as yet unexplained, reason, this skewing of the risks was not spotted, or was not acted upon by re-basing the risk profiles of the CDOs. Thus, what had started as a useful, if risky - but understood, asset, became junk, while the credit ratings agencies, and many of the buyers, remained unaware of this shift in its status.
While all this was going on in the US, India and China were continuing their rapid industrial expansion, consuming finite assets apace, and causing sharp increases in the prices of all raw materials. This put strain on the sales of American cars, whose manufacturers had not modernised in the good times, and their sales began to falter in the face of Japanese and European competition. The result was layoffs, in exactly the good old “rust belt”, where so many of the low cost mortgages had been taken out. There being little in the way of social security in the good old US of A, once the homeowners were laid off they couldn’t keep up the now escalating repayments on the mortgages, and many walked out of their houses. Unemployed people don’t take out mortgages, so the houses remained unsold while the defaults rose. Oh dear!
And so it came to pass that the clever boys of Lehman Bros etc, who had invented the CDOs, and the pension funds etc which had bought them, found their shiny (paper) new assets were no longer generating the expected revenue and, in the case of the banks - as they had lent against the value of these assets, and as their lending was controlled against the value of their assets - they realised had now lent more than the dear old “Fed” would tolerate. So, banks being banks, they sought to recall the loans. But of course, their debtors had by now lost their money on the empty houses, so couldn’t repay, and when the banks re-possessed, the properties were unsalable, and hence worthless. As so it was that Lehman’s went bankrupt owing billions to other banks, the other banks buckled, the CDOs became worthless, India and China lost money they had invested, banks stopped lending to banks because they couldn’t tell which bank might fail next, Northern Rock was unable to borrow to maintain its loans, Fred the Shred lost his trousers but kept his pension, and all those other things we all now know, would sooner not know, but wish we had known three years ago, came to pass.
Oh yes, Gordon. Is it his fault? No, of course it is not. He didn’t do any of the above. All he did is what any good politician does when the good times roll, he sat back and watched with a benign(ish) smile on his face while that bloke next door borrowed on his house to buy the 48” plasma telly, and was content. It seems he even encouraged the FSA to take a similarly uncritical attitude to silly bank behaviour when they should have, and we were encouraged to believe they would have, curtailed such stupidities as 120% self certified mortgages: but hey, the sun was shining! Hell, he was a popular guy, everyone was making money, so what could possible go wrong? Well, all of the above, actually, Prudence, as many tried, in different ways, to say, but were dismissed. It gets them all in the end, doesn’t it? Hubris, that is. That messianic belief that you can never do wrong. They are all prone to it, the Cameron’s, the Cleggs, and the Browns.
The problem for Gordon is that he has shown his weakness, he has amply demonstrated how Prudence could become a tart and a drunken lush if enough sailors (or bankers) said she was pretty, and they liked her. What cruel liars sailors (bankers) can be!
So, are we better off transferring our grasp to the apron strings of some unknown, strange, and more youthful new Prudence, or sticking to the fallen one in the hope she can redeem herself, pass through the eyes of several needles, and enter Parliament cleansed of her sins? Tough one, isn’t it?
Is that dilemma, perhaps, why so many of us seem to be wishing for not one, but two, new Prudences, in the hope they will watch over each other and call out warnings when the sailors (bankers) begin their siren whispers? Somehow, that seems comfortingly prudent to me!
Sorry, a bit long, but in the end I got carried away (again!) - just like that Gordon chap did.
Brian Kirby"